I conduct research in applied microeconomics, with special interests for health economics and law and economics. Specifically, my research focuses on the health care providers’ behavior, cooperation in primary care and medical malpractice liability. I use experimental and theoretical methods.
Title: Theoretical and Experimental Study of the Joint Liability between the Physician and the Advanced Practice Nurse
Supervisors: Prof. Cécile Bourreau-Dubois and Prof. Sophie Harnay
Jury: Prof. Sandrine Spaeter-Loehrer (Université de Strasbourg), Prof. Jérôme Wittwer (Université de Bordeaux), Prof. François Cochard (Université de Franche-Comté), Julien Monsquès (IRDES)
Defended on 6 November 2020
Collaboration in Health Care and Medical Malpractice Liability: An Experimental Investigation
Abstract: The treatment of a patient often implies consultations with different health care professionals. This complex health care pathway raises the issue of the regulation of health care quality. In this study, we explore how collaboration between health care professionals affects the precaution behavior of each one depending on the liability regime. To this end, we develop a theoretical model that is tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Each health care professional chooses the precaution level invested to treat the patient. His decisions have real consequences outside the lab for charities dealing with real patients. Experimental conditions vary the number of involved health care professionals and the liability regime. Contrary to theory, we show that the negligence rule and strict liability do not provide optimal incentives to take care. The negligence rule is more efficient than strict liability to reduce the absolute deviations from optimal precaution level. Moreover, under both liability rules, collaboration decreases the precaution level of health care professionals.
The Salaried Practice of the Advanced Practice Nurse: An Issue of Medical Malpractice
Abstract: The advanced nursing practice leads a physician and an advanced practice nurse to treat a patient together in the second line of care. The good quality of health care treatment depends on the physician’s precaution level and the nurse’s one. In this article, we study the allocation of liability between the physician and the advanced practice nurse for a joint damage under two liability regimes: strict liability and the negligence rule. We consider two types of advanced nursing practice: the advanced practice nurse is either salaried by the physician or independent from him. As health care treatment is a credence good, the patient imperfectly detects the medical error. We find that the negligence rule is more deterrent than strict liability, particularly if the detection of the medical error by the patient is high. Both types of practice are equivalent to deter health care professionals, except if health care professionals have patient-regarding preferences. In this latter case, the salaried practice dominates the independent practice in terms of deterrence.
Work in Progress
Why joining a multi-professional primary care team? An empirical study, joint work with Agnès Gramain
How sharing damages among multiple injurers? A literature review (in French)
Medical malpractice liability: A literature review (in French)